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the permanent commitment of a dependent child to a licensed child-
placing agency or HRS. The first step of every adoption of a dependent
child under that chapter is a complete termination of parental rights.
In order to so terminate those rights, the statute provides for personal
notice when possible, notice by publication when personal notice is
not possible, or waiver by written surrender of the child.
Incorporation of a similar provision into chapter 63, the Florida
adoption statute, would forestall cases such as Herzog and grant every-
one involved the rights and protections necessary for the security of
an adoption proceeding. By making the adoption procedure a two-
step process-termination of parental rights followed by creation of
parental rights-the confidentiality need could also be met.
M. CATHERINE LANNON
Criminal Law-ETHIcs-PuBLIc DEFENDER'S OFFICE IS A "LAW FIRM"
FOR PURPOSE OF DETERMINING WHETHER CONFLICT EXISTS IN REPRE-
SENTATION OF CODEFENDANTS- Turner v. State, 340 So. 2d 132 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
On July 19, 1976, Ernest W. Turner, Arthur T. Longway, and
Thomas C. Hyder were charged in a single information with the
offense of burglary of a structure in violation of section 810.02, Florida
Statutes.' The public defender was appointed to represent the three
codefendants after each had executed an affidavit of insolvency. 2
During a routine intake interview with Thomas Hyder, it was dis-
covered that a conflict of interest existed among the defenses of the
three men. Moreover, the assistant state attorney assigned to the prose-
cution of the three defendants informed both the public defender's
office and the court that each defendant had made statements that
implicated another codefendant. Consequently, the public defender's
office moved to be relieved as counsel for Turner and Longway. The
trial court relieved one assistant public defender as individual counsel
for Turner and Longway, but refused to appoint private counsel to
represent them on the ground that separate attorneys within the public
defender's office could properly represent the three codefendants.3
1. FLA. STAT. § 810.02(1) (1975) provides: "'Burglary' means entering or remaining
in a structure or a conveyance with the intent to commit an offense therein, unless
the premises are at the time open to the public or the defendant is licensed or invited
to enter or remain." The offense may be a felony of the first, second, or third degree
depending on the circumstances involved.
2: See FLA. STAT. § 27.52 (1975).
3, The trial court stated: "fI]t appear[s] to the Court that the Public Defender
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Two additional assistant public defenders were assigned to
represent Turner and Longway, respectively. Immediately following
their appointment, these attorneys filed renewed motions to be relieved
as counsel for Turner and Longway due to the conflict of interest
among the defenses of the three codefendants. The motions were
denied.4 Following this denial, defendant Longway sought and received
permission to represent himself due to the very conflict alleged by the
attorneys.5 Despite this development, defendants Hyder and Turner
were still represented by the public defender's office. 6 Believing that a
conflict of interest remained, counsel for Turner filed a petition for a
writ of certiorari7 in the Second District Court of Appeal, asking re-
view of the order denying the renewed motion to be relieved as
counsel. The Second District Court of Appeal granted the writ, quashed
the order, and remanded the cause for further proceedings.8 In a per
curiam opinion, the court held that the constitutional right to counsel
means that counsel must not have divided loyalty between conflicting
interests, and that a public defender's office is analogous to a private
law firm for purposes of regulation under Canon 5 of the Florida
Code of Professional Responsibility.
The court of appeal considered two issues. First, did the appoint-
of this Judicial Circuit has ample other Assistant Public Defenders he can assign to
defend said Defendant if necessary .... ." Brief for Respondent at 5, Turner v. State,
340 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
4. No. 76-329F (Fla. Cir. Ct. Manatee County, Aug. 12, 1976).
5. Longway moved for permission to represent himself as a result of an informal
bargain with the state: if Longway wanted to resolve his problems swiftly, he could
plead guilty, waive his right to counsel, and represent himself in exchange for a
probable sentence of six months. Telephone conversation of the author with Mr.
Nevin A. Weiner, Assistant Public Defender (Mar. 31, 1977).
6. While the appeal was pending, defendant Hyder entered a negotiated guilty
plea, and his case was disposed of.
7. The petition was filed pursuant to FLA. CONST. art. V, § 4(b)(3); FLA. App. R.
4.5(c).
8. Turner v. State, 340 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976). The court relied
on representations of counsel that conflict existed between the defenses of the co-
defendants, since the alleged conflict revolved around confidential statements made by
each defendant which implicated the others. On remand, the trial court assigned a
special assistant public defender (private counsel) to represent Turner pursuant to
FLA. STAT. § 27.53 (Supp. 1976). That attorney filed a motion for discharge pursuant
to the Speedy Trial Rule, FLA. R. CRiM. P. 3.191, asserting that the state's failure to
provide Turner with the proper counsel according to its obligation caused the defendant
to be involuntarily unavailable for trial during the time required by the rule. The
trial court did not discharge the case against Turner but imposed a sentence of time
served awaiting trial and ordered him released. This disposition was reached in
order to conclude the case and to prevent further petitions to higher courts on the
theory that the speedy trial period had run. Letter to the author from Mr. Nevin A.
Weiner, Assistant Public Defender (Feb. 17, 1977); telephone conversation of the
author with Mr. Weiner (Mar. 31, 1977).
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ment of one attorney to represent three codefendants, each of whom
made statements which implicated the others, deny the defendants
effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the sixth amendment
to the United States Constitution?9 Second, did the appointment of
separate attorneys within the office of the public defender to represent
the three codefendants circumvent Disciplinary Rule 5-105 of Canon 5,
Florida Code of Professional Responsibility?10 This rule incorporates
the notion of effective representation by requiring that a lawyer with-
draw from employment where a partner or associate of his firm would
be required to withdraw due to a conflict of interest in the representa-
tion of another client.
Relative to the first issue, the court stated that "[t]he Sixth Amend-
ment guarantee of the assistance of counsel includes the right to
counsel whose loyalty is not divided between clients with conflicting
interests. . . . [I]n the case of appointed counsel it is especially im-
portant for the court to determine that no prejudice will result from
multiple representation."'" The court cited the leading authority in
this area of the law, Glasser v. United States.12 In that case, Glasser and
four codefendants were convicted of conspiracy to defraud the United
States Government. At trial, one of Glasser's codefendants expressed
dissatisfaction with his appointed counsel. The trial court appointed
Glasser's attorney to represent this codefendant despite its knowledge
of potentially inconsistent interests and over the objections of both
Glasser and his attorney. Glasser appealed, contending that the appoint-
ment of his counsel to represent his codefendant created a situation
violative of his fundamental rights since it denied him the effective
assistance of counsel. The United States Supreme Court reversed his
conviction and ordered a new trial.'3 The Court held that "the
'assistance of counsel' guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment contem-
plates that such assistance be untrammeled and unimpaired by a
court order requiring that one lawyer shall simultaneously represent
conflicting interests. ' '1 4 In discussing the issue of whether the dual
9. U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."
10. FLA. BAR CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 5-105(A) provides: "A
lawyer shall decline proffered employment if the exercise of his independent profes-
sional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely affected by the
acceptance of the proffered employment .... ." DR 5-105(D) provides: "If a lawyer
is required to decline employment or to withdraw from employment under DR 5-105,
no partner or associate of his or his firm may accept or continue such employment."-
11. 340 So. 2d at 133 (citations omitted).
12. 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
13. Id. at 76.
14. Id. at 70,
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representation had prejudiced Glasser, the Court stated that "[t]he
right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute
to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of
prejudice arising from its denial." 1 5 Earlier, the Court had noted that
"[i]rrespective of any conflict of interest, the additional burden of
representing another party may conceivably impair counsel's effective-
ness."'16 But in refusing to reverse the convictions of the codefendants,
the Court held that "they must show that the denial of Glasser's
constitutional rights prejudiced them-in some manner . ...- 17
The Turner court also cited Baker v. State,- a Florida Supreme
Court case which applied the Glasser rule by noting that "[tlhe
interests and defenses of most co-defendants are conflicting .... [This]
makes it impossible for the same counsel to effectively represent two
or more co-defendants simultaneously."10 The Baker court held that
it was unnecessary for the defendants to show that prejudice resulted
from the denial of separate counsel.20
The third case cited by the Turner court regarding the right to
effective counsel was Marshall v. State,21 which required that separate
counsel be appointed where requested, unless the state could demon-
strate that prejudice would not result from a denial of the request. A
denial without a showing by the state that no prejudice would result
constituted reversible error.22 Finally, the court cited Craig v. United
StateS2 3 and United States v. Gougis,2 4 which held that the abrogation
of effective assistance of counsel where there were conflicting interests
applied not only to retained counsel, but to court-appointed counsel
as well.
With regard to the second issue, i.e., whether this mandatory
representation circumvented Disciplinary Rule 5-105 of Canon 5,
Florida Code of Professional Responsibility, 25 the Turner court held
15. Id. at 76.
16. Id. at 75.
17. Id. at 76 (emphasis added). See Comment, Conflict of Interests: Multiple De-
fendants Represented by a Single Court-Appointed Counsel, 74 DICK. L. REv. 241 (1970)
[hereinafter Conflict of Interests], for an excellent discussion of the ways in which
other jurisdictions have resolved the confusion created by the Court's interchangeable
use of the terms "prejudice" and "conflict of interest."
18. 202 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 1967). Two defendants were represented jointly by two
court-appointed counsel; both defendants were found guilty of felony murder and
appealed on grounds of denial of the right to assistance of counsel.
19. Id. at 566.
20. Id.
21. 273 So. 2d 412. (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1973)..
* 22. Id. at 413.
23. 217 F.2d 355 (6th Cir. 1954).
24. 374 F.2d 758 (7th Cir. 1967).
25. Quoted-at note 10 supra. .
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that "the public defender's office of a given circuit [was] a 'firm' within
. . . this canon."26 The court referred to Allen v. District Court"7 and
Commonwealth v. Bracey.-8 Neither case held the public defender's
office to be a firm within their respective codes of ethics, but held
that "the trial judge's denial of the motion to withdraw placed the
public defender in an untenable position '' 29 and resulted in the denial
of effective assistance of counsel2 0
Two areas of current Florida law have been affected by the Turner
decision: criminal law and ethics. First, the criminal law now requires
that where a conflict of interest prohibits single representation of co-
defendants, the court should appoint counsel other than those em-
ployed by the public defender. Second, ethical standards regarding
the representation of conflicting interests will be applied to each public
defender's office as if it were a law firm. A general discussion of each
area follows.
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." The United
States Supreme Court has interpreted this amendment to require that
criminal defendants in federal court be represented by counsel unless
the right to counsel is competently and intelligently waived.3' The
Court has held the sixth amendment right to the assistance of counsel
applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment.3'2 The
Court considers the right to counsel so "necessary to insure funda-
mental human rights of life and liberty"33 that its denial acts as a
bar to a valid conviction. To meet this requirement, the Florida Legis-
lature established the Public Defender System.3 4 The system provides
26. 340 So. 2d at 133 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
27. 519 P.2d 351 (Colo. 1974).
28. 307 A.2d 320 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1973).
29. Allen v. District Court, 519 P.2d at 353.
30. Commonwealth v. Bracey, 307 A.2d at 320.
31. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
32. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (misdemeanors for which imprison-
ment may be imposed); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (felonies). This
right has been expanded to include mandatory representation (unless waived)
during custodial interrogation, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); at postindict-
ment line-up, United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); at preliminary hearing, White
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963); and at probation revocation hearings, Mempa v. Rhay,
389 U.S. 128 (1967).
33. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938).
34. See FLA. STAT. § 27.50 (1975). Under this system, an accused has no right to
have a particular attorney appointed to him, Diehl v. State, 200 So. 2d 240 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1967), nor to arbitrarily reject a particular attorney, Donald v. State,
166 So. 2d 453 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1964). For a comparison between the public
defender system and the assigned counsel system, see I L. SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE
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for the appointment of counsel not affiliated with the public defender
where a conflict of interest arises among codefendants. 35 It is the
application of this provision which has been troublesome.
While certain minimum standards of "effective assistance of
counsel" have been delineated by the courts,3 6 the United States Su-
preme Court has addressed itself only once to the same issue in cases
where an attorney was forced to represent more than one codefendant.
This was done in the previously mentioned case of Glasser v. United
States,31 where the Court held that the right to assistance of counsel
"contemplates that such assistance be untrammeled and unimpaired
by a court order requiring that one lawyer shall simultaneously
represent conflicting interests. ' ss However, "conflicting interests" re-
mained undefined after Glasser.
Starting with the basic admonition from the Sermon on the Mount
that "[n]o man can serve two masters, ' ' 39 the treatises have found a
conflict of interest "where the defenses of co-defendants are antago-
nistic or where one co-defendant attempts to exculpate himself at the
expense of his co-defendant. ' ' 40 Similarly, conflicts exist "where it is a
lawyer's duty to contend on behalf of one client for that which
his duty to another client requires him to oppose .... 41
The courts, however, have encountered substantial difficulties in
their attempts to define conflicting interests. Although superficially
the Glasser opinion appears to give a straightforward definition of
conflicts, four phrases have been problematic for the courts.42 They are
1) [i]rrespective of any conflict of interest, the additional burden of
representing another party may conceivably impair counsel's
effectiveness; 43
2) [t]he right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and
POOR IN CRIMINAL CASES IN AMERICAN STATE COURTS (1965); JOINT COMMITTEE ON CON-
TINUING LEGAL EDUCATION OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE AND THE AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION-THE PROBLEM OF ASSISTANCE TO THE INDIGENT ACCUSED (1961).
35. FLA. STAT. § 27.53(3) (Supp. 1976).
36. Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d 787 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
37. 315 U.S. 60. The United States Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in
Holloway v. Arkansas, which raises the constitutionality of requiring a single public
defender to represent three codefendants, all of whom denied any involvement in the
alleged offense but did not attempt to incriminate others. 97 S. Ct. 1643 (1977).
38. 315 U.S. at 70.
39. Matthew 6:24. In his well-known treatise, H. S. Drinker notes that the word
"can" connotes "not so much the fact that this is wrong, as that it will not work."
H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 22 n.5 (1953).
40. Conflict of Interests, supra note 17, at 256.
41. R. WISE, LEGAL ETHICS 139 (1966).
42. See generally Conflict of Interests, supra note 17.
43. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. at 75.
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absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the
amount of prejudice arising from its denial; 4
3) [the codefendants] must show that the denial of Glasser's constitu-
tional rights prejudiced them in some manner . . .;45 and
4) [it is the duty of the court] to refrain from embarrassing counsel
• . . by insisting, or indeed, even suggesting, that counsel under-
take to concurrently represent interests which might diverge from
those of his firstclient .... 4
Consequently, in attempting to determine whether the right to
effective assistance of counsel requires that codefendants be represented
separately, courts have alternately adopted "conflict of interest,
prejudice, and embarrassment of counsel as the indicia of ineffective-
ness."
47
The history of the various interpretations of Glasser adopted by
the Florida courts is a curious one. In Baker v. State," the Florida
Supreme Court discussed whether two defendants who were found
guilty of felony murder were denied effective representation where
each was represented jointly by two court-appointed counsel. The
court held that Glasser dictated that "it was unnecessary that the de-
fendants show prejudice flowing from the denial to them of separate
counsel. ' ' 4 The court reasoned that "[t]he interests and defenses of
most co-defendants are conflicting. . . . It is this conflict and incon-
sistency of position which makes it impossible for the same counsel
to effectively represent two or more co-defendants simultaneously." 50
The court reversed the convictions.5'
Following this supreme court decision, the Fourth District Court
of Appeal in Youngblood v. State52 interpreted Baker as supporting
automatic appointment of separate counsel for codefendants. While
seemingly a valid interpretation of the Baker language, Youngblood
was overruled by the supreme court. 3 In its decision, the supreme
44. Id. at 76 (citations omitted).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Note, Criminal Codefendants and the Sixth Amendment: The Case for Separate
Counsel, 58 GEo. L.J. 369, 375-76 (1969) [hereinafter The Case for Separate Counsel].
48. 202 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 1967).
49. Id. at 566. The court focused on the language in Glasser that "[t]he right to
have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to in-
dulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its denial." 315
U.S. at 76.
50. 202 So. 2d 563, 566.
51. Id. at 567.
52. 206 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1968), rev'd, 217 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 1968).
53. State v. Youngblood, 217 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 1968).
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court referred to Belton v. State,54 a decision rendered after Baker. In
Belton, the court held that failure to appoint separate counsel for co-
defendants was not error "in the absence of a request for separate
counsel or a showing of prejudice . . . ."- The supreme court applied
the Belton holding to State v. Youngblood and ruled that
[w]hen a joint defendant requests separate counsel, his request
should be granted unless the state can clearly demonstrate for the
record that prejudice will not result from a denial. If request is made
and the record shows prejudice . . . or is silent on the subject, such
denial will constitute reversible error.5 6
In these holdings, the supreme court has made it plain that every co-
defendant will not automatically be entitled to the undivided
assistance of a single attorney. The court failed, however, to specify the
circumstances in which the state could demonstrate the absence of
prejudice.57
A case-by-case evaluation reveals that prejudice does not occur,
nor is reversal required, where all codefendants enter guilty pleas,"'
or where counsel employs similar trial tactics for all codefendants or
fails to employ varying ones. 59 Reversal has resulted where a confes-
sion of one defendant which implicates another defendant has been
introduced into evidence.60 While one court has held that a defendant
voluntarily waives his right to appointment of separate counsel by fail-
ing to object to appointment of a single counsel at the time of the
appointment, that conviction was overturned.61 The law does not favor
the waiver of rights,62 with the result that a waiver is "not to be
lightly inferred-it must be shown to have been knowingly, voluntarily
54. 217 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1968).
55. Id. at 98.
56. Id. at 101.
57. For a summary of the various situations in which state and federal courts
have found ineffective assistance of counsel, see J. COOK, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE
ACCUSED: TRIAL RIGHTS § 4, at 155 (1974).
58. Williams v. State, 268 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Gardner v. State,
214 So. 2d 786 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1968); Williams v. State, 214 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1968); Wellington v. Wainwright, 214 So. 2d 28 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.
1968); Mitchell v. State, 213 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
59. Sotomayor v. State, 224 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Stone v. Statei
196 So. 2d 445 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
60. Baker v. Wainwright, 422 F.2d 145 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927 (1970);
Marshall v. State, 273 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
61. Baker v. State, 217 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1969), writ of habeas
corpus granted sub nom. Baker v. Wainwright, 422 F.2d 145 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
399 U.S. 927 (1970). The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Florida had refused to grant a writ of habeas corpus, and its decision was appealed.
62. Craig v. United States, 217 F.2d 355 (6th Cir. 1954).
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and intentionally made." 3 In summary, "[w]here one attorney is
appointed to represent two defendants at a joint trial he must be alert
to facts indicating a possible conflict and, if they arise, promptly call
them to the court's attention.' ' 64 Any doubt as to whether possible
conflicts of interest will impair effective assistance of counsel should
be resolved in favor of granting a motion for separate counsel.65
The Turner decision also affects the area of ethics. The Florida
Code of Professional Responsibility66 mandates that "[a] lawyer should
exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of a client."67
This mandate compels an attorney to exercise his professional judg-
ment "solely for the benefit of his client and free of compromising
influences and loyalties, ' ' 68 and "precludes [an attorney's] acceptance
or continuation of employment that will adversely affect his judgment
on behalf of or dilute his loyalty to a client."6 When a lawyer is con-
fronted with two or more clients whose interests conflict, "he must
weigh carefully the possibility that his judgment may be impaired or
his loyalty divided . . . . He should resolve all doubts against the
propriety of the representation." 70 An attorney is rarely justified in
accepting the representation because "[i]f a lawyer accepted such em-
ployment and the interests did become actually differing, he would
have to withdraw from employment with [the] likelihood of resulting
hardship on the clients; and for this reason it is preferable that he
refuse the employment initially."'" In fact, prior to deciding to
represent multiple clients, an attorney "should explain fully to each
client the implications of the common representation and should
accept or continue employment only if the clients consent."7 2
The Disciplinary Rules further provide that "[a] lawyer shall
not continue multiple employment if the exercise of his independent
professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be
adversely affected by his representation of another client .... 73 More-
63. Baker v. Wainwright, 422 F.2d at 149.
64. Gravitt v. United States, 523 F.2d 1211, 1219 (5th Cir. 1975).
65. Lollar v. United States, 376 F.2d 243, 247 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
66. INTEGRATION RULE OF THE FLORIDA BAR, art. X (effective Oct. 1, 1970) pro-
vides that "the Code of Professional Responsibility promulgated by order of the
Supreme Court of Florida entered June 30, .1970, and the Canon of Ethics for Judges
promulgated by the Supreme Court of Florida on June 27, 1941, as thereafter amended
shall constitute a code of ethics applicable to the members of The Florida Bar.
67. FLA. BAR CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, CANON 5.
68. Id., EC 5-1.
69. id., EC 5-14.
70. Id., EC 5-15.
71. Id.
72. Id., EC 5-16.
73. Id., DR 5-105(B). However, the representation is allowed where "it is ob-
[Vol. 5
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over, "[i]f a lawyer is required to decline employment or to withdraw
from employment under [the aforementioned] Disciplinary Rule, no
partner or associate of his or his firm may accept or continue such
employment." 74 Law firms are reasonably included in this rule.75
Generally, there is ready access to confidential information between
the members of a law firm,76 and such information is susceptible to dis-
closure due to the close association of the members of the firm. The
economic situation which results from the sharing of profits within a
private law firm is another reason given for the regulation. 7 7 The
possible destruction of the confidential relationship between the
attorney and the client and the loss of public confidence in the bar
and legal system further explain the inclusion of firms under this
rule.78
Using a similar analysis, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
in Borden v. Borden7 9 analogized a legal aid program financed by
the Office of Economic Opportunity to a firm for purposes of regula-
tion by the American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsi-
bility. 0 In Borden, the plaintiff-wife who sought a divorce from her
husband was represented by an attorney from a legal aid program.
Upon plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel to represent her
defendant-husband, the trial court appointed another attorney from
the program for that purpose. Both attorneys moved to set the court's
appointment aside, arguing that it created conflicts of interest. Reason-
ing that since the attorneys were not paid by their clients there was
no conflict of interest, the court denied the motion."' The appellate
court reversed, noting that the legal aid attorneys "practice[d] their
profession side-by-side, literally and figuratively . ... 82 Because of
this, they were "subject to subtle influences that may well [have affected]
their professional judgment and loyalty to their clients, even though
they [were] not faced with the more easily recognized economic con-
flict of interest."' 3 Thus, the conflict of interest inherent in this
vious that he can represent the interests of each and if each consents to the representa-
tion. . I..." d., DR 5--105(C).
74. Id., DR 5-105(D).
75. For an analysis, see 37 Mo. L. REv. 346 (1972).
76. Id. at 348, citing United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y.
1955).
77. Id., citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILrTY, EC 5-22.
78. 37 Mo. L. REv. at 348.
79. 277 A.2d 89 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971).
80. Id. at 91.
81. Id. at9O.
82. Id. at 91.
83. Id.
1977]
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representation necessitated the appointment of counsel other than
that employed by the legal aid program.
Another case utilizing the "free flow of information" analysis is
Allen v. District Court,8 4 which was cited by the Turner court. In
Allen, the public defender was appointed to represent a welfare
recipient charged with fraudulently obtaining welfare assistance. The
public defender was subsequently appointed to represent a welfare
department employee who was to be the prosecution's chief witness
against the recipient, but who was himself charged with theft and em-
bezzlement of welfare payments.8 5 Prior to trial, the public defender's
motion to withdraw from representation of the welfare department
employee was denied in part.86 On appeal of this denial, the Supreme
Court of Colorado, although not declaring the public defender's
office to be a firm for purposes of regulation under its code of ethics,
considered the factors operating within the public defender's office
which made it impossible to represent conflicting interests. The court
declared that "even though different members of the public defender's
staff were representing [the two defendants], the knowledge ... gained
by any member of the staff would be attributed to the other."8 17 Ac-
cordingly, the resulting conflict was to be avoided by allowing the
public defender to withdraw from representation of the employee.8,
While Florida courts have never held that a legal aid service is
analogous to a firm for purposes of regulation by the Code of Ethics,
the Professional Ethics Committee of The Florida Bar has opined that
"absent consent . . . it would not be proper for this, OEO [legal
services] program to provide representation of conflicting interests,
whether different lawyers provided the representation, or whether
different 'law offices' [operating within the program are] involved."8 19
Consent "must be procured with extreme caution, and ... any doubt
whatever must be resolved against the representation. "0 The opinion
was based on the "co-mingling of records" and the "ordinary inter-
change of information between attorneys typical of -any large law
firm" which took place in the legal services office.91 While the Pro-
84. 519 P.2d 351 (Colo. 1974).
85. Id. at 352.
86. The public defender was allowed to withdraw from representation on the
theft and conspiracy charges but not on the embezzlement charge. Id. at 352.
87. Id. at 353.
88. Id.





fessional Ethics Committee opinion is only advisory,92 it illustrates a
line of thinking similar to that of the Borden and Allen courts.
Although the Turner decision is merely an extension of the current
Florida criminal law in this area, it was the first appellate decision in
Florida to make a determination of prejudice prior to a plenary trial
on the merits. 93 The court seems to have taken a step in the direction
of a per se rule requiring separate counsel for each codefendant. How-
ever, the decision is more likely a warning to the trial courts that
they should take upon themselves the duty of protection of defendants'
rights, by appointing separate counsel at the first suggestion of a con-
flict of interest.94 This position has been impliedly advocated by many,
including the Glasser and Allen courts.9 5 It is, as one student has noted,
a necessary solution to an otherwise "potentially unresolvable situa-
tion" 916 because "[r]egardless of how harmonious the situation appears
before trial, the possibility of conflict is always present where two de-
fendants are represented by the same counsel."9
The Turner decision is consistent with the Florida Supreme
Court's holding in State v. Youngblood 4 By requiring the appoint-
ment of separate counsel when conflict exists between the defenses of
the codefendants, the Turner court follows the Youngblood test: a
court must grant a request for separate counsel unless the state demon-
strates that prejudice will not result from single representation.9
At first glance, the Youngblood holding seems inconsistent with
the rules enunciated in Glasser'"o and Baker.1'0 Both Glasser and Baker
92. FLA. BAR PROFESSIONAL ETHICS COMM., Op. 66-56 at 396, 397 (1967).
93. For support of the position that the Turner court takes, see The Case for
Separate Counsel, supra note 47, at 389-90.
94. See id. at 389.
FLA. STAT. § 27.53(3) (Supp. 1976) provides:
If at any time during the representation of two or more indigents the public
defender shall determine that the interests of those accused are so adverse or
hostile that they cannot all be counseled by the public defender or his staff
without conflict of interest, . . . it shall be his duty to move the court to
appoint one or more members of The Florida- Bar who are in no way affiliated
with the public defender . . . . to represent those accused. However, the trial
court shall appoint such other counsel upon its own motion when the facts
developed upon the face of the record and files in the cause disclose such
conflict ..
95. "Irrespective of any conflict of interest, the additional burden of represent-
ing another party may conceivably impair counsel's effectiveness." Glasser v. United
States, 315 U.S. 60, 75 (1942). See also Allen v. District Court, 519 P.2d 351 (Colo. 1974);
The Case for Separate Counsel, supra note 47, at 389.
96. Conflict of Interests, supra note 17, at 259.
97. Id. at 258, citing Morgan v. United States, 396 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1968).
98. 217 So. 2d 98.
99. Id.
100. 315 U.S. 60.
101. 202 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 1967).
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indicate a preference for separate counsel even in the absence of a
showing of prejudice.1 0 2 Youngblood holds likewise, as long as a re-
quest has been made for separate counsel. On the other hand, "[i]f no
request for separate counsel is made ... reversible error does not occur
unless the record reveals that some prejudice results from the failure
to appoint separate lawyers for each defendant."1 3 Viewed from this
perspective, the Glasser and Baker courts ruled as they did because
objections to joint counsel and requests for separate representation
had been raised at the trial level.10 4
In the area of ethics, the decision to analogize a public defender's
office to a private law firm for purposes of regulation by the Code of
Professional Responsibility is unprecedented in Florida case law.
Following the Borden lead seems well-advised. Indeed, the Borden
court included public defenders in its admonition: "We should avoid
always any action that would give the appearance that government
attorneys are 'legal Hessians' hired 'to do a job' rather than attorneys
at law. ''1 0 5
The reason for viewing the office of the public defender as a firm
for purposes of ethical regulation is a sound one. Although the public
defender's office lacks the economic conflict of interest typically in-
volved in a firm, the close association of the attorneys in the public
defender's office makes it possible that confidential information will
be inadvertently circulated. The necessity of utilizing the services of
the same investigator, the inevitable discussions occurring in the office
among the attorneys, and the overlapping sources of information from
identical witnesses all contribute to this possibility.1 16 Furthermore,
public confidence in the public defender and the Bar as a whole must
be maintained. In order to do this, lawyers must "not only avoid evil,
102. See discussion accompanying notes 48-51 supra.
.103. State v. Youngblood, 217 So. 2d at 101.
104. If, as in Youngblood, no request for separate counsel is made at the trial
level, a plenary trial ensues. It is possible that during the course of this trial, the de-
fendants may unknowingly waive all nonjurisdictional defects by entering voluntary
guilty pleas. See Gardner v. Wainwright, 433 F.2d 137, 139 (5th Cir. 1970). Moreover,
ethical considerations may demand that the appointed attorney withdraw from the
representation of all defendants due to information and knowledge gained during the
representation. See H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETics 112 (1953); R. WISE, LEGAL ETHics 156
(1966). In addition, if prejudice arises during the course of the trial, the State is
burdened with the cost of the appeal, the cost of a retrial if so ordered, and the subse-
quent cost of outside counsel as required. In the long run, the practice of appointing
special assistant public defenders where a conflict of interest requires the public de-
fender to withdraw from representation of codefendants is more efficacious when per-
formed prior to trial.
105. 277 A.2d. at 93.
106. Memorandum in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, Turner v.
State, 340 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
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but also the appearance of evil."'17 Thus, where an attorney requests
permission to withdraw from an appointment in an effort toward
self-regulation of his conduct according to ethical standards, a court
should never force him into an untenable position by requiring that
he represent adverse interests. By appointing separate attorneys for
individual defendants where there is alleged conflict, the courts up-
hold not only the individual's constitutional rights and protections,
but also the integrity of the entire criminal justice system.
MELANIE HINES ALFORD
Eminent Domain-PRIoR PUBLIC USE DOCTRINE: NEW JUDICIAL
CRITERIA-Florida East Coast Railway v. City of Miami, 321 So. 2d
545 (Fla. 1975).
The City of Miami brought condemnation proceedings to acquire,
for use as a public park, land owned by the Florida East Coast Railway
Company (hereinafter FEC).1 The railroad asserted, as an affirmative
defense, that the prior public use doctrine precluded the city's con-
demnation of the land. This doctrine provides that property presently
being used for a public purpose by an entity having the power of
condemnation cannot be condemned by another entity that has the
same general power of condemnation. 2 The prior public use doctrine
107. R. WISE, LEGAL ETHIcS 2 (1966).
1. FLA. STAT. § 166.401 (1975) grants the power of eminent domain to municipalities:
All municipalities in the state may exercise the right and power of eminent domain;
that is, the right to appropriate property within the state, except state or federal
property, for the uses or purposes authorized pursuant to this part. The absolute
fee simple title to all property so taken and acquired shall vest in such municipal
corporation unless the municipality seeks to condemn a particular right or estate
in such property.
FLA. STAT. § 166A1 (1975) gives the condemnation power to cities for the purpose of
establishing public parks:
Municipalities are authorized to exercise the power of eminent domain for the
following uses or purposes:
(4) For public parks, squares, and grounds .
For a background discussion of the theory of eminent domain, see Stoebuck, A
General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553 (1972).
2. Property that has been acquired by the power of eminent domain and is presently
being put to an important public use cannot be reappropriated for another use unless
the second appropriation is expressly granted by the legislature or arises as a necessary
implication. This rule was stated in Adirondack Ry. v. New York, 176 U.S. 335, 349
(1900): "It is true that the State may delegate the power [of eminent domain], and
where it has done so to a railroad corporation and by its exercise lands have been
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